A New Nationalism in China

I first visited Chengdu, capital of Sichuan province, in 1999 -- shortly before the official celebrations of the “opening” of China’s West. I remember a pleasant provincial town with a smallish feeling -- by China’s standards (it already had about 6 or 7 million inhabitants).

Today, it is a vibrant, spread-out city of 11 to 14 million inhabitants (depending on whether one counts the migrant workers or not), with modern sky scrapers, eight-lane highways, traffic jams, and all. Then, automobiles were sparse; now, Chengdu has 1.8 million registered cars and issues 1,500 new license plates every day.

Yet, people here are cheerful, unrushed and, in spite of the near-doubling of the city’s population in six years, growth does not seem to have created the kind of stress typical of big, bustling cities. One understands why many Chinese in large eastern and southern cities dream of a house in Chengdu: were it not for a sky that is more often grey than blue, the atmosphere could be Californian or Mediterranean.

China Rediscovering Itself

I went to Chengdu in part to visit a real estate development in Wenjian district, about 35 minutes from downtown Chengdu, where a friend from Shenzhen recently purchased a vacation home.

Many real estate developments in China still tend to be kitschy, pompously grandiose, drab neo-soviet or simply in dubious taste. Some aim to emulate France’s Versailles palace, others to replicate entire English countryside towns, for example, like Thames Town (below) in a new suburb of Shanghai.



Thus, I was ready for almost anything. Yet, in Shenzhen, we already had dined in a beautifully landscaped housing development with small, three-floor, pastel-colored townhouses arranged around a park with artificial lake and canals. The feeling had been reminiscent of Port Grimaud, a highly praised village-resort on the French Riviera.

What was new for me in this Wenjian community was that the small apartment houses, on nearly 135 acres of which only ten percent are zoned for building, are designed in totally Chinese style, inspired from the traditional architectures of various regions. The lavish landscaping, with canals, trees, flower parterres, water wheels, bridges and the like, is equally Chinese in character.



Pictures of my friend’s triplex apartment in Chengdu

The club house, with swimming pool and tennis upstairs, tends to resemble one of the imposing buildings around Tiananmen Square. But, downstairs, it sports a traditional tea house from which arise the sounds of classical Chinese instruments.

My friend’s neighbors are doctors, university professors, small-business owners and the like: well-to-do, but not today’s instant super-rich. Most of them do not live there but come on week-ends from Chengdu and other nearby towns, or on vacation from farther.

A New Nationalism

This, and other observations on this visit, left me with the feeling that today’s China, at the same time that it enthusiastically embraces the luxuries, fashions and modern lifestyles of the West, is trying to recapture its heritage – in some ways, to become more Chinese again.

Only yesterday, the Chinese seemed concerned only with learning about and importing foreign technology, designs, fashions, and lifestyles. There was almost an excessive modesty about their attitudes (except at some state-controlled entities, where people could remain fairly arrogant). All this is beginning to change, as a new nationalistic pride is unabashedly surfacing.

This coincides with some significant achievements – not only in international trade, but also in sports, arts and science: the purchase of IBM’s personal computer business by Lenovo, the emergence of some world-renowned athletes in disciplines where China did not shine in the past (track events, basketball), and the recent, successful space voyage of the “Taikonautes” are just a few recent examples.

Li Ning, named for and promoted by China’s champion gymnast, has become the largest athletic shoe and sports apparel brand in China and Nike, to fight back, has had to closely associate its name with Liu Xiang, the first Chinese to win an Olympic gold medal at a track event.

At the same time, new painters and movie makers are emerging, helped by the more “Chinese” taste of the new middle class, as is a whole new generation of Chinese fashion designers that create primarily for Chinese women. In a Shanghai store, my wife was attracted by an incredibly refined and sophisticated new dress collection… but it was only available in a single size (Chinese petite): good luck American and European customers!

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

Beyond its welcome aspects, this new rise of popular nationalism does carry some risks, however.

In particular, it coincides with a hardening of the central government’s control over the country. By all accounts, the Party’s grip is being tightened everywhere: dissidents are systematically muted or eliminated under the excuse of fighting corruption (which, by most accounts has not lessened in recent years); censure is being applied more harshly on the media and the Internet. I had thought that, perhaps, at the same time that the Party’s control was being strengthened, some democratic evolution was taking place within the Party itself. This does not seem to be the case and some observers tell me that, if anything, old ideologies are being dusted off by an increasingly powerful President.

For a while, now, I have been uncomfortable about developments inside China. At the same time that President Hu Jintao has seemed to be engineering what some have labeled a new personality cult (ài> la Chairman Mao), Beijing has been busy putting out an increasing number of fires around the country. So far, everyone agrees that the revolts and riots, though reported in the thousands, remain isolated incidents. They usually are caused by gripes against local employers or government officials, and there seems to be no general resentment against the central government in Beijing – nor any visible effort by anyone to coordinate local uprisings into a national movement. But the longer-term risk seems to be on everyone’s mind.

Foreign Scapegoats

What concerns me is that, in the past, foreign policy has often been used by Beijing as a means to rally public opinion by focusing it away from domestic problems.

In fact, this is how I interpreted the recent flare up about a new Japanese textbook that did not acknowledge Japan’s atrocities during the war, and Prime Minister Koizumi’s failure to properly apologize for these atrocities. The problem is far from new and, so, the timing of China’s popular demonstrations seemed somewhat suspicious. After all, the usual instrument for China’s revivals of nationalistic spirit, Taiwan, is currently being wooed by Beijing. (China’s leaders are courting the Kuomintang opposition party, which has taken a dovish stance towards the Mainland). Japan thus seemed like a natural alternative scapegoat to rally public opinion.

In recent months, I have had several occasions to realize how profound the resentment of Japan in China really is, and also to understand that, in the Chinese mind, buying Japanese goods or attracting Japanese tourists and capital are not necessarily contradictory with viewing Japan as an enemy. Nevertheless, the recent anti-Japan uprising was at least condoned by Beijing. Otherwise, I assume that the national leadership would not have felt it necessary to provide buses to transport demonstrators from the provinces into the capital.

More Volatility Ahead

It is in this context that my beginning remarks about a revival of Chinese nationalism may be relevant. In a cultural and philosophical sense, this revival is admirable and welcome. But it also provides fertile ground for potential manipulation by China’s central government should the domestic economic or social situation deteriorate. And in a more nationalistic, more assertive China, proud of its heritage, crowd moods may be increasingly difficult to fine-tune.

On this trip, I detected few obvious signs of an economic slowdown. But, should some forward-looking seers be correct in anticipating a significant one in 2006, the situation in China could become much more volatile and its government’s reactions much more unpredictable.

François Sicart

November 9, 2005

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